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Discussions in social psychology overlook an important way in which biases can be
encoded in conceptual representations. Most accounts of implicit bias focus on ‘mere
associations’ between features and representations of social groups. While some have
argued that some implicit biases must have a richer conceptual structure, they have
said little about what this richer structure might be. To address this lacuna, we
build on research in philosophy and cognitive science demonstrating that concepts
represent dependency relations between features. These relations, in turn, determine
the centrality of a feature f for a concept C: roughly, the more features of C depend on
f , the more central f is for C. In this paper, we argue that the dependency networks
that link features can encode significant biases. To support this claim, we present a
series of studies that show how a particular brilliance-gender bias is encoded in the
dependency networks which are part of the concepts of female and male academics.
We also argue that biases which are encoded in dependency networks have unique
implications for social cognition.
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1 Introduction
The notion of a stereotype is one of the most important theoretical constructs in
social psychology. Key properties of implicit biases relevant to social cognition
are often directly explained via properties of the stereotypes which encode them,
and the notion is thought to be sufficiently robust to partially explain some ob-
served patterns of discrimination (Valian, 1998; Banaji and Greenwald, 2013;
∗This paper benefited greatly from discussions with audiences at the Experimental Philos-
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St. Andrews. We are especially grateful to James Andow, James Hampton and an anonymous
reviewer. This research has been supported by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation.
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Beeghly, 2015; Leslie et al., 2015). For example, in an important recent study of
gender inequality in academia, Leslie et al. (2015) show that women are under-
represented in fields whose members believe that brilliance is a more important
determinant of success than hard work. How could such ‘field-specific beliefs’
causally affect gender distribution in academic fields? One way, according to the
authors, is that field-specific beliefs interact with a pernicious cultural stereo-
type according to which women are less innately/naturally brilliant than men.
In accounts such as this, what, precisely, is the operative notion of a stereotype?
In particular, are there different ways in which stereotypes could encode some-
thing like this brilliance-gender bias, each having unique implications for social
cognition?
The view that our representations of categories include stereotypes or proto-
types—the latter being the preferred term in most technical discussions—has
a long tradition in cognitive science (Rosch, 1999, 2011; Fodor, 1998; Murphy,
2002; Prinz, 2002; Pinker, 2007; Hampton, 2006; Machery, 2006). To a first ap-
proximation, prototypes are sets of features that we use to represent categories.
In most accounts, to say that a feature f is associated with category C, or is
part of the prototype for C, is to say that f is typical, cue valid, salient, or
available for C. We shall call these sorts of relations, ‘salient-statistical’ associ-
ations. Importantly, theoretical discussions of the structure of concepts, partly
due to the influence of psychological essentialism, tend to recognize that this
notion of ‘prototypes’ as bundles of salient-statistical features is, at best, in-
complete (Keil, 1989; Gelman and Wellman, 1991; Murphy, 2002; Carey, 2009;
Hampton, 2006). At the same time, this simple notion has been adopted in
social psychology, especially in discussions of implicit bias. Indeed, the most
widely used measure of bias—the IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998)—is a measure
of the availability of features for certain categories.
To be clear, the study of stereotypes as salient-statistical associations has
played a key role in discovering many important social biases, and has shed light
on the implications of implicit bias for social cognition (Fazio and Olson 2003;
Greenwald et al. 2009; Lane et al. 2007, but see Oswald et al. 2013 for a critical
response). Still, we think that an exclusive focus on stereotypes as bundles
of salient-statistical features results in a severely incomplete understanding of
the nature of bias and its role in social cognition. More specifically, we will
defend the following two claims. First, there are important kinds of biases
that depend on ‘deeper’ aspects of concepts and prototypes, some of which can
elude detection through associative measures.1 Secondly, this class of biases has
unique implications for social cognition.
To illustrate, consider again Leslie et al. (2015)’s hypothesis that women are
stereotyped as having less innate brilliance than men. Call this the ‘brilliance-
gender’ bias. There is suggestive evidence that most societies suffer from a
‘brilliance-gender’ stereotype (Meyer et al., 2015). For example, Bennett (1996,
1997), Tiedemann (2000), and Furnham et al. (2006) show that men and parents
1For recent accounts of ‘deeper’ or more ‘essentialist’ dimensions of social role concepts,
see e.g. Knobe et al. (2013), Leslie (2015) and Del Pinal and Reuter (2016).
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of boys tend to overestimate their mathematical abilities and IQ while women
and parents of girls tend to underestimate these abilities. Storage et al. (2016)
found that the frequency with which the words ‘brilliant’ were used in anony-
mous evaluations of teachers on RateMyProfessors.com predicted the extent to
which academic fields were dominated by white men, and Stephens-Davidowitz
(2014) reports that Google searches like ‘is my son gifted?’ were 2.5 times more
common than searches like ‘is my daughter gifted?’2 However, what is less
studied and understood is how precisely the underlying gender bias is encoded.
If we take prototypes as bundles of salient-statistical associations, Leslie et al.
(2015)’s hypothesis is naturally construed as saying that features such as smart,
intelligent or brilliant are thought to be more likely or typical amongst men than
women, or are more salient or available when people think of male than when
they think of female members of certain groups. It follows that the hypothesized
brilliance-gender bias should be revealed by measures of typicality, saliency, and
related ‘associations’. Suppose, however, that IATs don’t find that people as-
sociate smart etc. more strongly with male than with female categories,3 and
that measures of typicality don’t find that participants think of women as less
typically smart or brilliant than men. If this pattern of results is systematically
replicated, should we conclude that the brilliance-gender stereotype is not, de-
spite all the suggestive indirect evidence, as prevalent and problematic as Leslie
et al. (2015) propose?
We should not. To see why, we need to consider the aspects of prototypes
ignored by the simplified notion, and draw the implications for alternative ways
in which biases such as the brilliance-gender stereotype can be encoded. Most
cognitive scientists now hold that prototypes represent, in addition to sets of
salient-statistical features, information about certain relations between those
features (Sloman et al., 1998; Hampton, 2006). These sets of relations, which
we will call ‘dependency networks’, represent how the constituent features of a
concept depend on each other. For example, the concept bird includes infor-
mation that flying depends on having wings. Dependency networks determine
the degree of centrality of features. If more features of prototype C depend on
f1 than on f2, then f1 is more central for C than f2. Importantly, the degree
of centrality of features doesn’t generally correlate with their salient-statistical
associative strength:
• f can be central in C and not have a high salient-statistical rating for
C. For example, has a heart is a central feature of tigers. However, it
2For additional research on biases related to attribution of effort versus natural talent, see
Ra¨ty et al. (2002); Tsay and Banaji (2011); Smith et al. (2013); Jackson and Nystro¨m (2015).
Thanks to Allison Master for guidance on these references. For consideration of the role that
a ‘smartness’ bias plays specifically in philosophy, see Schwitzgebel (2010) and Saul (2013).
3Interestingly, we have not been able to find direct ‘brilliance/intelligence gender’ IATs
in the empirical literature. We are currently developing several IATs to directly test for the
strength of these associations. Assuming that philosophy is associated with a high degree of
intelligence or brilliance, the most relevant IATs we found are reported in Di Bella et al. (2016),
who found in 2 of 3 studies that, on average, participants did not implicitly associate male
and philosophy on an IAT. They did find, however, that men tended to associate philosophy
with male, while women tended to associate it with female.
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does not have a high cue validity because so many non-tigers also have
a heart, and it is not salient because, in the usual encounters, we cannot
perceptually use it to pick out tigers.
• f can have a high salient-statistical rating for C and yet not be central.
Striped is a salient and typical feature of tigers, quite useful to pick them
out. However, it is unlikely to be highly central because most features of
tigers do not depend on their being striped.
Sloman, Love, and Ahn (1998)’s foundational paper on conceptual centrality
provides substantial evidence in support of this disassociation between ratings
of centrality and of salient-statistical associations. Assume that features f1 . . . fn
are the constituents of C. Sloman et al. show that various measures of centrality
correlate in their ordering of f1 . . . fn, but do not correlate with any of the
orderings determined by measures of either typicality, cue validity, saliency, or
availability. Hence, even if f is associated with C in terms of salient-statistical
associations, it does not follow that f is central for C; and even if f is central
for C, it does not follow that f is a salient or typical feature of C.
We can now illustrate why Leslie et al. (2015)’s brilliance-gender stereotype
should not be assumed to be solely encoded in patterns of salient-statistical
associations. Given the lack of correlation just described, even if the brilliance-
gender stereotype is not encoded in salient-statistical associations, it could still
be encoded in dependency networks. In principle, it is easy to see how this
could happen. As target features, take hardworking and smart, and as target
concepts, take female and male professor. Suppose hardworking and smart
are judged to be equally distributed amongst female and male professors (cf.
Study 1 below). This is compatible with hardworking being more central for
female than for male professor. This could happen if the stereotypes have
the following structure: the dependency of smart on hardworking is significantly
stronger in female than in male professor (cf. Studies 2-3 below). Intu-
itively speaking, this would mean that even if female professors are thought to
be, on average, as smart as their male colleagues, they are implicitly assumed to
have had to work harder for that. This bias would have significant implications.
For example, suppose Paul learns that Peter and Mary, both Professors, are
not very hardworking. Since Paul also implicitly thinks that female professors’
intelligence depends on their being hardworking, he might conclude that Mary
is not that smart. At the same time, since Paul thinks that male professors’
intelligence does not depend on being hardworking (e.g., because they tend to
be innately smart), he is less likely to draw the same conclusion about Peter.4
4Two clarification are in order. First, Leslie et al. (2015) tend to formulate the ‘brilliance-
gender’ stereotype in terms of notions such as ‘brilliance’ and ‘raw innate intelligence’. Here
and in the studies presented below, we take terms such as smart, intelligent and brilliance
as forming an equivalence class denoting some relatively coarse grained feature +SMART
(just as we take terms such as hardworking, dedicated, determined as forming an equivalence
class). In addition, in the studies where we provide participants with set options (Studies
1a-b and 3), we chose to represent this equivalence class using the term smart rather than
brilliant. The rationale is that in our free production experiments (Preliminary Study and
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Specific kinds of dependency networks, then, represent one way in which
the brilliance-gender stereotype could be encoded. Studies 2-3 below strongly
suggest that the scenario just described is indeed one way in which dependency
networks encode the brilliance-gender stereotype. Specifically, the studies, taken
together, suggest that (i) dependency networks can encode socially significant
biases, (ii) that there are useful measures of centrality and dependency between
features, which can be adapted to study biases, and (iii) that we would overlook
and misunderstand the nature of these biases if we focused only on measures of
salient-statistical associations. In the General Discussion, we describe some of
the philosophical implications of these results.
2 Preliminary Study: Semantic Feature Produc-
tion Task
To determine how the brilliance-gender stereotype is encoded, and what role fea-
tures such as smart (incl. intelligent, brilliant, clever) and hardworking (incl.
determined, dedicated, committed) play in the corresponding conceptual struc-
tures, it is important to first empirically generate the relevant prototypes. The
brilliance-gender stereotype could be manifested in various, somewhat different
gender concepts, including female/male student, female/male child,
woman, man, etc. In these studies, we focus on the concepts of female and
male professors. Accordingly, the aim of this Preliminary Study was to
generate prototypes for those target concepts. Given that information, we can
determine whether target features such as smart and hardworking are in fact
part of the prototypes, and whether there are any gender differences with re-
spect to how frequently participants generate those target features. To do this,
we used a simple semantic feature production task, which is a standard way of
generating prototypes (McRae et al., 2005). This Preliminary Study provides
some initial insights into the structure of our target concepts, which we will
then explore in detail in Studies 1-3. The prediction is that we should observe
some key gender differences, in female and male professor, with respect to
the generation of the target features. It is important to note that, although this
Preliminary Study is not designed to test any fine-grained claims, that is in no
way a trivial prediction. For although, as we mentioned in the Introduction,
it is generally assumed that even self-described egalitarian societies suffer from
Study 2) participants rarely produced the feature brilliance to describe, say, why a given
individual succeeded as a professor. Instead, by far the most frequently produced term was
smart, with intelligent coming in second. At the same time, it will become clear when we
present the experiments that, in the tasks we used, the potential differences between these
terms seem relatively unimportant, even if in other experimental settings we should certainly
distinguish between features such as smart and brilliant. The second clarification regards the
choice of social role concepts, namely, professors. The rationale for this was straightforward:
we chose these social roles because they were highly likely to generate, in free production
tasks, features such as smart and hardworking as important part of their prototypes, thereby
allowing us to study their inter-depedency. Obviously, future investigations of the brilliance-
gender stereotype should explore other kinds of social role terms.
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something like a brilliance-gender stereotype, this view could well be mistaken.
Indeed, Leslie et al. (2015) assume and do not directly investigate that claim,
although that is not their main concern.5 Furthermore, it might be that, even
if the brilliance-gender stereotype exists, it is not manifested in the concepts of
female and male professors.
2.1 Methods
312 participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk and reim-
bursed for their participation.6 Using a between-subject design, participants
were asked to generate features for certain social categories. Participants were
randomly assigned to a condition (N = 103) featuring either a female or a male
professor. To determine whether participants were processing the mentioned
profession and not just the gender of the target stimuli, and vice versa, we also
asked participants to generate features in two control conditions. The first con-
trol condition asked participants to generate features for a female or male baker
(N = 101), and the second for an actress or actor (N = 108). The target stimuli
read as follows:
Imagine that Mary/Jack is a professor at a university.
Please list five features that you think are typical of Mary/Jack.
2.2 Results
The key results of the Preliminary Study are summarized in Table 1. The fea-
tures which were most frequently produced, for the prototype of both female and
male professor, were those belonging to the equivalence class of smart (= smart,
intelligent, clever, brilliant, with smart being the most commonly used term).
The production frequency of smart was slightly but not significantly higher in
the female (76.6%) than in the male condition (72.4%): χ2 = 1.264, p = 0.473.
Another set of features frequently produced for female and male professors were
those belonging to the equivalence class of hard work (= hard working, de-
termined, dedicated, committed). Importantly, we found that the production
5The aim of Leslie et al. (2015)’s study is to show that field-specific beliefs predict female
underrepresentation, and not to directly examine the nature of the hypothesised brilliance-
gender stereotype (but see Meyer et al. (2015) and some of the references cited there). At
the same time, it is important for their overall story that there actually be something like the
brilliance-gender stereotype. First, this stereotype is invoked in their account of the mech-
anisms that causally connect the field-specific belief with the observed gender distributions
across academic fields. Second, the assumption that it exists affects their recommendations
for tackling the underrepresentation of women in various fields.
6All the participants for our studies were recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. As
Meyer et al. (2015) point out, Mechanical Turk offers a convenient sample rather than a
fully nationally representative sample: several studies show that women are overrepresented,
workers are typically younger and more educated than average, and Blacks and Hispanics are
underrepresented (Berinsky et al., 2012; Paolacci and Chandler, 2014). Still, as they point
out, ‘the diversity of an MTurk sample is arguably higher than that of most samples used in
human subjects research (i.e., college samples)...’.
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frequency of hard work was almost twice as high for female (39.6%) than for
male professors (21.3%). This difference was significant: χ2 = 4.71, p = 0.030.
As shown in Table 1, there are no significant differences in the production fre-
quency of hard work in the female vs. male versions of the control conditions.
This suggests that these results are not due to participants focusing just on
female vs. male groups, or professors vs. other professions, but specifically on
female vs. male professors.
Male Female χ2 p
Professor +hardworking 21.3% 39.5% 4.709 0.030
Professor +smart 72.4.% 76.6% 1.264 0.473
Actor/Actress +hardworking 7.5% 10.9% 0.36 0.547
Actor/Actress +smart 17% 10.9% 0.77 0.380
Baker +hardworking 24.5.% 19.2% 0.41 0.522
Baker +smart 10.2% 1.9% 3.09 0.079
Table 1: Results of the Preliminary Study in terms of % of participants who
generated the feature for the specified category.
2.3 Discussion
This Preliminary Study used a standard semantic feature production task to
generate prototypes for female and male professors. The results support
our choice of stimuli for investigating the brilliance-gender stereotype. First,
(the equivalence classes of) smart and hard work were the most frequently pro-
duced features for each class, and hence are clearly important constituents of
the corresponding prototypes.7 Second, we observe a key and significant gen-
der difference involving these features, namely, that hard work was produced
more frequently for female professor. In addition to validating our stim-
uli, this Preliminary Study also has important implications for certain—and
at first glance tempting—views about how the brilliance-stereotype is encoded.
Perhaps the most intuitive prediction would be that the stereotype would be
encoded in a ‘direct’ way, with the production frequency of smart being signif-
icantly higher for male than for female professors. The results suggest that the
brilliance-gender stereotype is encoded in a more intricate way, which is some-
how related to the significantly greater weight of hard work in female profes-
sor. Importantly, this difference is unlikely to be due to a general stereotype
according to which female professionals are more hard working, since this sig-
nificant difference is not observed in the non-academic professions used in our
controls.
7Note that the term brilliant was actually the term least frequently produced amongst this
equivalence class. Since smart was the term most frequently produced, we used this term in
our stimuli in Studies 1 and 3 below.
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This Preliminary Study is neither intended nor can be used to determine
what the detailed structural role of hardworking in the target prototypes might
be, and how that relates to the hypothesis that there is a brilliance-gender
stereotype. Still, the following claim seems worth exploring: female professors
are represented as more hardworking than male professors because they are
assumed to have to make up for their having less raw or innate intelligence.
This view would have to be squared with another key result of this Preliminary
Study, namely, that smart was produced with very high and indistinguishable
frequency for female as for male professors. Indeed, it might initially seem
that this result is in tension with the hypothesis that there is a brilliance-
gender stereotype. This is why it is crucial to remember that, as we argued in
the Introduction, prototypes encode not only salient-statistical associations, but
also dependencies between features. Even if smart is equally typical for female
and male professors, it might differ in terms of its role in the corresponding
dependency networks, and thereby encode a brilliance-gender bias. Studies 2-3
below support and elaborate this suggestion.
3 Study 1: Typicality Experiments
The Preliminary Study shows that a key difference between the prototypes for
female and male professors is the significantly higher weight of hard work
in the former. According to the framework we laid out in the Introduction, to
fully understand this difference we have to determine the degree of centrality of
hard work and its position in the dependency networks for each of the target
prototypes. However, it is also important to examine the relation between the
prototypes generated in the Preliminary Study and direct judgments about the
perceived distribution of smart and hard work amongst female and male pro-
fessors. We need to do this for at least three reasons. First, it could be that
the difference between hard work in female and male professor is due to
differences in participants’ estimates of the distribution of that feature in each
class. That is, it could be that participants simply think female professors are
more likely to be hardworking than male professors. Second, it could also turn
out that the semantic feature production task is not sensitive to differences in
judgments about the distribution of smart amongst female and male profes-
sors. In other words, even if there is no difference in production frequency of
smart for the target gender categories, participants might still judge that, say,
female professors are more likely to be smart than male professors, or vice versa.
Third, judgments of the distribution of smart and hard work help us determine
whether the differences obtained in the Preliminary Study are due to the per-
ceived statistical properties of these features in the target classes. The aim of
Studies 1a-b is to examine these possibilities. As in the Preliminary Study, each
participant received questions about only one gender. In this way, participants
could not compare their answers across the female/male conditions, and censor
themselves by correcting any perceived gender differences.
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3.1 Methods of Study 1a
186 participants were assigned to both versions of either the female (N = 94)
or the male (N = 92) questions:
(1) Consider the class of female professors. What percentage of all those
professors do you think are very smart/hardworking? Please give your
best estimate.
(2) Consider the class of male professors. What percentage of all those pro-
fessors do you think are very smart/hardworking? Please give your best
estimate.
3.2 Results
The results of Study 1a are summarized in Table 2. We analyzed the data
using a repeated measures ANOVA with Gender a between-subject factor and
Smart/Hardworking a within-subject factor. There was a significant main ef-
fect for Smart/Hardworking F (1, 184) = 66.69; p < 0.001, η2 = 0.27 (on aver-
age participants believed that a larger proportion of professors are smart than
hardworking), but no significant main effect for Gender, F (1, 184) = 0.97; p =
0.324, η2 = 0.01. A significant interaction was recorded for Smart/Hardworking*
Gender : F (1, 184) = 5.23; p = 0.023, η2 = 0.03. A simple t-test showed that
there is a small but non-significant difference in the proportion of female vs.
male professors who are believed to be hardworking; t(184) = 1.804, p = 0.073.
Slightly more female than male professors are believed to be hardworking (M =
67.5%, SD = 23.4 vs. M = 61.3%, SD = 23.3).
Male Prof. Female Prof.
hardworking 61.3% 67.8%
smart 76.1% 75.8%
Table 2: Results of Study 1a: listing the response frequencies for male and
female professors for hardworking and smart.
3.3 Methods of Study 1b
Study 1b is a different way of approaching the same issue examined in Study
1a. One worry with Study 1a is that mentioning an abstract category such
as ‘female professors’ might signal to participants that they are engaged in a
gender task. So in Study 1b we used common first names instead. Using a
between-subject design, we presented 104 participants with either a female or
male condition, and asked them to rate, on a 7-point Likert scale (1= ‘not
very likely’ and 7= ’very likely’) one of the following questions (female&smart:
N = 24, female&hard work: N = 26, male&smart: N = 26, male&hard work:
N = 26):
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(3) Mary is a professor. How likely do you think it is that she is very
smart/hardworking?
(4) Jack is a professor. How likely do you think it is that he is very smart/hard-
working?
3.4 Results
The results of Study 1b are presented in Table 3. The results corroborate Study
1a. Participants judged that a female or male professor is likely to be both smart
and hardworking, and there was no significant gender difference in the likelihood
judgements. A 2 X 2 ANOVA was performed to analyze the data. No significant
effects were found for the independent factors Gender and Smart/Hardworking :
F (1, 103) = 0.05; p = 0.832 & F (1, 103) = 1.11; p = 0.295. The small, non-
significant differences obtained in this study are in the same direction as those
obtained in Study 2a: men get slightly higher numbers for smart and women
for hard work.
Male Prof. Female Prof.
hardworking 5.7 5.9
smart 6.0 5.9
Table 3: Results Study 1b: Mean values for all four conditions.
3.5 Discussion of Studies 1a-b
The results of Studies 1a-b are clear: participants’ judgements about the dis-
tribution of smart and hard work amongst female and male professors do not
show any significant differences. This lack of effect is interesting in light of the
Preliminary Study, which shows that hard work has more weight in the proto-
type for female than in male professor. As we argued before, the weight
of a feature in a concept is due to various factors, including its degree of typ-
icality and centrality. Studies 1a-b examine whether the differences obtained
in the Preliminary Study could simply be due to perceived differences in the
distribution of hard work in the class of female vs. male professors. Two differ-
ent, corroborating sources of evidence suggest that this is unlikely. In addition,
Studies 1a-b also examine whether, despite the lack of a difference in the free
production task, participants still judge that male professors are more likely to
be smart compared to female professors. This would be a relatively direct way of
encoding the brilliance-gender stereotype, but the results clearly argue against
this hypothesis. To be sure, Studies 1a-b use explicit, direct measures, which one
might reasonably worry allow for some degree of self-censorship. However, our
between-subject design reduces the possibility that the lack of a gender effect
is due to participants adjusting their estimates to eliminate gender differences.
Overall, then, Studies 1a-b suggest that the uniquely high weight of hard work
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for female professor might be more intimately connected with its degree of
centrality and interdependencies than with its purely statistical properties such
as typicality and cue validity.8 Studies 2-3 directly examine this suggestion.
4 Study 2: Centrality via causal reasoning task
We have seen that hardworking has more weight in female professor than
in male professor. Studies 1a-b suggest that this difference is not due to
participants judging that female professors are more likely to be hardworking
than their male counterparts. Now, prototypes, we have argued, encode not only
salient-statistical associations, but also information about the interdependency
between features, and their degree of centrality. Studies 2 and 3 explore our
main hypothesis, namely, that the brilliance-gender stereotype, as manifested
in concepts for professors, is encoded in dependency networks. We begin by
investigating, in Study 2, whether there are differences in the overall centrality
of hard work and smart in female vs male professors.
To appreciate the motivation behind Study 2, we must understand why
measures of typicality and centrality/dependency can dissociate. Suppose that
the prototypes office chair and breakfast chair both include the feature
has a back, which is judged to be equally typical. Even so, has a back might
have a different degree of centrality in each prototype. For example, office chairs
are mostly used to sit for extended periods of time. Comfort is very important.
Breakfast chairs are mostly used for shorter periods of time. So although comfort
is important, other things might also matter, say, being compact. Accordingly,
people might think that, even if has a back just happens to be found with
similar likelihood amongst office and breakfast chairs, it is significantly more
central for office chairs. Regardless of the current distribution, compared to
breakfast chairs, only the basic function of office chairs directly depends on
having a back.
Following this logic, Study 2 examines whether, despite being indistinguish-
able in terms of their perceived likelihood amongst female and male professors,
the features hardworking and smart differ in their degree of centrality. The
design we adopt is based on work by Johnson and Keil (2000).9 We adapted
a simple causal reasoning task in which participants are asked to produce fea-
tures that they think are causally or explanatorily ‘deep’. As in the Preliminary
Study, this was a free production task, but in this case participants had to
generate features that best ‘explain’ key properties of the female/male profes-
sor target class. Since we are interested in gender differences in the way in
which smart and hardworking are thought to account for academic success, we
8If the likelihood of f for class C1 and for class C2 is the same, then the cue validity of f
for C1 (= P (C1|f)) cannot be different from its cue validity for C2 (= P (C2|f)), assuming
they are compared with reference to the same alternative classes (as is likely the case when
comparing female and male professors).
9Frank Keil, in particular, has developed various experimental designs for tapping into
intuitions of the centrality of features for particular concepts (see, e.g., Keil, 1989, 2003,
2006).
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designed a scheme that asked participants to generate the features that ‘best
explain’ why female and male individuals managed to become successful pro-
fessors. Our hypothesis predicts that we should observe a significantly higher
production frequency of hardworking in the causal scheme for female professors.
4.1 Methods
203 participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: two target
conditions featuring either a female (N = 51) or a male professor (N = 50),
and two control conditions featuring either an actress (N = 52) or an actor
(N = 50). The respective reasoning schemes had the following form:
(5) a. Becoming a professor (actress/actor) is hard.
b. Mary/Jack has recently become a professor (actress/actor).
c. Therefore, Mary/Jack must be .
Participants were asked to enter the feature that they think would best fit the
reasoning scheme.
4.2 Results
The results of Study 2 are summarised in Table 4. In the female and the male
versions of the target condition (professor), the features most frequently pro-
duced were hard work and smart (i.e., the equivalence class of synonymous terms
in each case). 45.1% of participants produced hard work for female professor
and 27.5% for male professor. There was a minor difference in the production
of smart : 29.4% for female professor, and 27.5% for male professor. In contrast,
in the control condition, 57.7% of the participants produced hard work for ac-
tress, compared to 68.0% for actor. No participant produced smart for actress
and only one for actor. This pattern of results indicates that participants were
processing the stimuli as intended, and took account of the specific profession
under consideration: although both professions require hard work for success,
being smart is judged to be important for professors but irrelevant for successful
acting careers.
To examine gender differences, we used a binary logistic regression and com-
pared the target (professor) with the control condition (actor/actress) as well
as the effect of gender. Hard work responses were coded as 1s whereas any
other responses were coded as 0s. The logistic regression model was statis-
tically significant, χ2(4) = 21.810, p < 0.001. The model correctly classi-
fied 64.0% of cases, Nagelkerke R2 = 0.136. Gender (male, female), (B =
−0.984,Wald χ2 = 4.246, p = 0.039), and Condition (experimental, control),
(B = −1.880,Wald χ2 = 17.469, p < 0.001), were significant predictors. The in-
teraction between Gender and Condition was also significant (B = 1.338,Wald
χ2 = 4.985, p = 0.026). A simple χ2 analysis revealed that the difference in the
production frequency of hard work in the experimental condition was significant
(χ2 = 4.38, p = 0.036). We also ran a binary logistic regression for smart : smart
responses were coded as 1s and any other responses as 0s. While the model was
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statistically significant (χ2(4) = 39.137, p < 0.001, Nagelkerke R2 = 0.309) and
95.2% of responses correctly classified, only Condition was a significant predic-
tor (B = −2.976,Wald χ2 = 7.902, p = 0.005).
Male Prof. Female Prof. Actor Actress
hardworking 27.5% 45.5% 68.0% 57.7%
smart 27.5.% 29.4% 2.0% 0.0%
Table 4: Results of Study 2: Production frequency for both the experimental
condition (professor) as well as the control condition (actor/actress) for hard-
working and smart.
4.3 Discussion
Study 2 tapped into features that are explanatorily central for female and
male professors. Specifically, participants generated features to complete a
reasoning scheme that ‘explains’ why female or male individuals managed to
become professors. In contrast to the lack of gender differences observed in the
typicality Studies 1a-b, participants in Study 2 were more likely to generate
hardworking for the scheme involving a female compared to a male professor.
This suggests that hardworking has more weight in the prototype for female
professor because it is more central. The results also support part of our
hypothesis, namely, that gender differences are encoded in differences in the
degree of centrality of features.10 Note that our control condition reversed
the main result: hardworking was generated more frequently for actors than
for actresses. Hence, it is unlikely that the main result is due to participants
assuming that, in general or for any given profession, women have to work
harder than men for similar achievements. Overall, the results of the causal
reasoning task strongly suggest that hardworking has a more central role in the
prototypes for female than for male professor.
Study 2 has, however, an important limitation. Our hypothesis is not just
that there are gender differences in female vs. male professor. It is that
these differences, as manifested in those concepts, encode something like the
brilliance-gender stereotype hypothesised by Leslie et al. (2015), according to
which women are represented as less naturally brilliant than men. Now, it
might be tempting to connect the results of Study 2 and the brilliance-gender
stereotype as follows. Since participants think that women have to work harder
than men to reach the same level of academic success, doesn’t this reveal an
implicit assumption that women have less raw brilliance, which is presumably
why they have to work harder? We cannot yet jump to that conclusion. This is
10Our stimuli mentioned that becoming a professor is hard. Due to priming, this might
have caused an overall increase in the frequency of production of terms such as hard work.
However, even if this is case, it does not affect the main result. That priming effect should
affect both the female and male conditions, so it cannot account for the significantly different
frequencies with which hard work was generated across those conditions.
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in part because, in the causal reasoning task, smart was produced with high and
indistinguishable frequency for female and male professors. This can be
reasonably taken to suggest that there might be other reasons, not connected
with presumed brilliance-gender differences, why participants believe that fe-
male professors have to work harder than their male counterparts (e.g., maybe
people assume that they simply face more obstacles). In short, despite the
observed gender differences in the centrality of hard work, we do not yet have
direct evidence that the brilliance-gender stereotype is encoded in dependency
networks.
5 Study 3: Gender differences in dependency
between smart and hard work
Study 2 shows that hardworking is more central in female than in male pro-
fessor. We cannot yet conclude, however, that this is because people implicitly
assume an intellectual disadvantage, since it might be due to the assumed pres-
ence of obstacles independent of that stereotype. Now, the reason why the role
of hardworking seems crucial to determine how the brilliance-gender stereotype
is encoded, if at all, is simple. Roughly speaking, qualities like being brilliant or
very smart can be conceived of as acquired capacities, as traits that are innately
possessed, or as a combination of both (Dweck, 2000, 2006). People will likely
disagree about the relative importance of each, and about whether there are
substantial differences across social groups. Despite those disagreements, most
would accept inferences like the following: if Mary is less naturally intelligent
than Susan, and all else is equal, Mary will have to work harder than Susan
to achieve the same level of actual smartness. In this scenario, smart depends
more on hard work for Mary than for Susan. The point is just that differences in
the interdependency of smart specifically on hardworking are one way in which
the brilliance-gender stereotype could be encoded in our target concepts.
Following this reasoning, Study 3 was designed to examine possible differ-
ences in the interdependencies between hardworking and smart in female vs
male professors. According to our hypothesis, smart should depend more on
hardworking in female than in male professors. To determine this, however,
we cannot just ask participants how ‘hardworking’, say, a particularly accom-
plished female and male professor is, and then directly compare the average
estimates for each gender. The reason is connected with the main limitation of
Study 2: even if women are judged as more hardworking, it might be because of
non-intellectual obstacles. To get around this obstacle, we opted for the follow-
ing design. We described particularly successful female and male professors, and
asked participants to estimate how hardworking they were, in terms of hours per
week. We also included an additional feature that these individuals are thought,
by their colleagues, to possess. In the control condition, this additional feature
was ‘being open-minded’, and in the target condition it was ‘being very smart’.
If smart depends more on hard work for female than for male professors, then
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there should be a greater difference, between the control and target conditions,
in the estimates of hours per week of work for female than for male professors.
Since the individuals described in all conditions are successful professors, any
non-intellectual obstacles which are thought to specifically affect women will be
reflected in the control condition, and will not influence the difference between
that target and control condition, which is the value of interest. Our prediction
is that there should be an interaction between gender and feature, such that
the female and smart-condition should have a stronger positive effect on hours
of work relative to the female and control condition, than the effect of the male
and smart-condition relative to the male and control condition.
5.1 Methods
200 participants were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Participants
were randomly assigned to one of the following four conditions: female&smart
(N = 52), female&control (N = 48), male-&smart (N = 50), and male&control
(N = 50). The statements for each of the four conditions read:
(Smart condition) Mary/Jack has recently become a professor at a pres-
tigious university. Her/His colleagues think of her/him as a very smart
person.
(Control condition) Mary/Jack has recently become a professor at a pres-
tigious university. Her/His colleagues think of her/him as a very open-
minded person.
After being presented with one of the vignettes, we asked them to answer the
following question:
(6) To get where s/he is now, how many hours a week did Mary/Jack work
during the last few years? Please give your best estimate.
Participants were asked to rate the number of hours of work per week on a scale
from 0 to 100 hours.
5.2 Results
The mean ratings for number of hours worked per week in the open-mindedness-
control condition were lower (M = 51.65, SD = 12.07) than those obtained in
the smart-condition (M = 54.39, SD = 14.16). A small difference was observed
between participants’ ratings of the female protagonist (M = 53.33, SD =
13.56) and the male protagonist (M = 52.77, SD = 12.94). The average re-
sponses for each of the four conditions are presented in Table 4. A 2 X 2
ANOVA was conducted with Gender (female, male) and Feature (smart, open-
mindedness) as independent factors, and Amount of hours as dependent mea-
sure. Gender, F (1, 196) = 0.05; p = 0.818, η2 < 0.01 and Feature, F (1, 196) =
2.17, p = 0.142, η2 = 0.01, were not significant. Importantly, however, the in-
teraction between Gender and Feature was significant, F (1, 196) = 4.36; p =
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0.038, η2 = 0.02. We followed up on the significant interaction by conducting
simple effect analyses using pairwise comparisons. Importantly, the compar-
ison between female & smart and female & open minded turned out to be
significant (t = 2.497, p = 0.014, two-tailed), while no significant difference was
observed between male & smart and male & open minded (t = −0.277, p =
0.782, two-tailed). The comparison between smart & male and smart & female
(t = −1.544, p = 0.126, two-tailed), as well as open minded & male and open
minded & female (t = 1.239, p = 0.218, two-tailed) were not significant.
Male Female
smart Prof. 52.20 56.50
open minded Prof. 53.34 49.89
Table 5: Results of Study 5: Mean values for male and female professors in terms
of hours per week when either smartness or open-mindedness was emphasised.
5.3 Discussion
Study 3 examined whether there is a gender difference, in the prototypes for
professors, in the dependency of smart on hard work. We asked participants
to indicate how hardworking—in terms of hours per week—a female and male
professor would have to be. The control and target conditions involved successful
professors at prestigious universities, but only the target condition emphasised
the feature of being especially smart. The results confirm our prediction: there
was an interaction between gender and feature. Specifically, female professors
whose smartness was emphasised were judged to have to work more hours,
relative to their control condition, whereas male professors whose smartness was
emphasised were not judged to have to work more hours, relative to their control
condition. These results undermine the competing account raised in response to
Study 2: namely, that female professors are conceived as more hardworking than
male professors because they have to overcome additional obstacles that are not
connected with presumed gender differences in raw or innate brilliance. For
that view predicts that successful female professors at prestigious places would
have to encounter these obstacles, regardless of whether they are described as
in the target or control condition. It follows that this view cannot account
for the differences in amount of work observed across conditions for female
professors. Furthermore, if assumed additional obstacles are the explanation for
why female professors are thought to be more hardworking, then participants
should judge that female professors are more hardworking than male professors
across the control conditions. But this is not the observed result: in contrast to
the target condition, which emphasised their brilliance, in the control condition
male professors are rated as more hardworking than female professors.11 To sum
11The hypothesis that (people think that) women simply encounter more obstacles can
perhaps be modified to explain the results, e.g. by arguing that open-mindedness causally
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up, Study 3 supports the view that smart depends more on hardworking in the
prototype for female vs. male professor. This directly supports Leslie et al.
(2015)’s hypothesis that there is a brilliance-gender stereotype, which in this case
is manifested in the prototypes for professors. In addition, it supports our main
contention, namely, that the brilliance-gender bias is encoded in the dependency
networks represented by the prototypes for female and male professor.
6 General Discussion
Our Studies examined whether the brilliance-gender stereotype is encoded in
the dependency networks of the prototypes for female and male profes-
sors. The Preliminary Study showed that the key gender difference concerns
the higher weight assigned to hard work in female compared to male pro-
fessor. Studies 1a-b suggest that this effect is not due to differences in the
estimates of how likely it is that female vs. male professors are hardworking. In
addition, neither the Preliminary Study nor Studies 1a-b showed gender differ-
ences with respect to the role of smart. In Studies 2-3, we explored the role of
smart and hardworking in the dependency networks of our target prototypes.
Using a simple causal reasoning task, Study 2 showed that hard work is more
central for female than for male professors. This suggests that more fea-
tures of female professor depend on hard work than of male professor.
Although our Preliminary Study showed that most features produced for the
class of professors had to do with intellectual and mental properties, Study 2
is compatible with the possibility that there is no brilliance-gender stereotype
and that the gender difference in the centrality of hard work is not due to de-
pendency relations to features such as smart. However, in Study 3 we examined
and confirmed that there are gender differences in the dependency of smart
specifically on hardworking. Overall, our studies support the hypothesis that
the brilliance-gender stereotype is encoded in dependency networks of female
and male professors.
We should be very clear about what we think we have and haven’t achieved.
We think we have provided evidence for the view that notions such as central-
ity and dependency are required to fully understand how the brilliance-gender
stereotype is encoded. We are not claiming, however, that this amounts to a
complete picture of the brilliance-gender stereotype. Important questions re-
main open. In particular, future studies should examine other measures of both
salient-statistical associations and centrality/dependency relations (see Sloman
et al., 1998; Keil, 1989). These additional studies will allow us to refine some
of our more simplistic assumptions and formulations. For example, we have
proceeded as if, in our basic-level concepts, terms like very smart and brilliant
stand for one ‘intelligence’ trait, which we can have to different degrees. Need-
less to say, there might be differences amongst those terms which can help refine
interferes with the perception of female professors as hardworking. However, this modification
is based on an ad hoc assumption, and it is not at all clear why being open-minded would
interfere with the perception of female professors as hardworking.
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our understanding of the way in which the brilliance-gender stereotype is en-
coded. Accordingly, future studies should explore whether we represent, in our
concepts of social groups, different kinds/ways of being intelligent—e.g., in rela-
tion to quickness, creativity, or type of problem-solving capacity—and how this
informs the brilliance-gender stereotype, including their relations to hard work.
Still, despite these open questions, we hope to have presented a serious case for
our main contention, namely, that important biases are encoded in the depen-
dency networks that we use to represent social groups.12 If in our empirical and
philosophical studies of social cognition we continue thinking of stereotypes as
bundles of salient-statistical associations, we will miss this important dimension
of the human mind. We will, moreover, fail to appreciate key obstacles facing
members of disadvantaged groups in academia, among other endeavors.13 In
the remainder of this General Discussion, we outline two implications of our ac-
count, both of which shed light on the uniqueness and importance of the notion
of conceptual centrality for a more complete picture of bias in social cognition.
6.1 Compositionality, centrality, and cross-contextual sta-
bility
There is a key difference in the cross-contextual behavior of salient-statistical
vs. centrally encoded biases. Namely, biases which are encoded just in salient-
statistical associations are less stable across contexts than those which depend
on central features. To see why, we need to turn to what might initially seem like
an unrelated topic, namely, the behavior of features in conceptual combinations
(for additional discussion, see Del Pinal and Spaulding, 2017).
Philosophers have pointed out, and empirical studies have largely confirmed,
that features which are associated with concepts merely via salient-statistical
relations often do not survive combinatorial operations (Barsalou, 1987; Fodor,
1998; Fodor and Lepore, 2002; Hampton, 2006; Murphy, 2002; Rey, 1983). Sup-
pose that mane is a feature of the prototype lion, which has high cue validity
(given a mane, the likelihood that there is a lion is high) and saliency (it is
easy to visually pick out lions by their manes). Still, mane does not survive
some trivial conceptual combinations involving lion: consider, e.g., baby lion,
female lion and, with a bit of imagination, trimmed lion. These combina-
tions are not ‘special’; rather, they are simple interactive combinations, with
the result that we move from basic level categories to more specific subcate-
gories. In contrast, it is widely recognized that features that are central are
more likely to survive similar conceptual combinations (Hampton, 1987, 2006;
Murphy, 2002). To illustrate, take the feature born of lion parents, which
is highly central for lion (cf. Keil, 1989), and consider your intuitions about the
complex concepts baby lion, female lion, and trimmed lion. Clearly, they
12For a complementary, theoretical defense of this thesis, see Del Pinal and Spaulding (2017).
13For example, Smith et al. (2013) found that despite having equal ability to men, women
thought they’d have to work harder in STEM or other male-dominated fields in order to suc-
ceed. Moreover, their beliefs about having to exert extra effort made them feel less interested
and less belonging in a male-dominated field (cf. Kiefer and Shih, 2006).
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all effortlessly inherit the feature born of lion parents. Importantly, the
combinatorial properties of features affect the content and structure of many
of the prototypes which we use in daily life. We often find ourselves in envi-
ronments where we need to sub-categorize. For example, suppose you are at a
lion nursery. To function in that environment, it is important that you operate
with the representation baby lion. In this way, you will not be looking out for
manes or constantly panic and perhaps hide in some closet; however, you will
still assume that the baby lions were born in the usual way.
At this point, we can see why the degree of centrality of the features which
encode a bias is an important determinant of the bias’ wider role in social cog-
nition. Suppose we have shown that feature f is more central to our conception
of female than to our conception of male. This means that f will have a
greater degree of cross-contextual stability for female; specifically, f will be
more likely to survive conceptual combinations and sub-categorisation involv-
ing female than those involving male. For example, f will be more likely
to survive composition into subcategories such as female lawyer, female
doctor and female politician than to survive into male lawyer, male
doctor and male politician. Furthermore, information about the details of
the dependency networks allows us to make even more refined predictions. To
illustrate, if, as we argued, smart depends more on hard work for female
than for male professors, then combinations and sub-categorisations that
tinker with hard work are predicted to have a stronger effect on smart in the
case of female professors. For example, we have seen that participants think
of professors as smart. Suppose we consider the class of lazy male/female
professors. These combinations lower the rating of hard work compared to
the default ratings it gets in professors. Given the gender differences in the
dependency networks, this is predicted to more negatively affect the perceived
degree of smartness for female than for male professors.
To sum up, notions like conceptual centrality and dependency networks are
crucial to understand the wider role of biases in social cognition. In particular,
they are crucial to determine the cross-contextual stability of target biases,
including biases encoded in salient-statistical associations. By incorporating
these notions into our accounts of stereotypes and prototypes, we also open up
a very rich set of new questions and predictions.
6.2 The varieties of implicit bias
While theorists have typically interpreted implicit biases as ‘mere associations’
between groups and salient or typical traits, some philosophers (Mandelbaum,
2016; Levy, 2015) and social psychologists (De Houwer, 2014) have argued that
implicit biases must have a richer conceptual or propositional structure (cf.
Madva, 2016; Madva and Brownstein, 2017). Broadly speaking, we agree that,
to understand the role of implicit biases in social cognition, focusing solely on
trait-group associations is misguided. We need to explore in detail what other
kinds of mental structures could underlie these sorts of biases. However, we
briefly note two ways in which our approach differs or extends existing accounts
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of the nature of implicit bias.
First, while these theorists have argued that implicit biases have a richer
conceptual structure, they haven’t, at this point, said much about the details
of this structure. For example, even if we grant that some implicit biases re-
flect beliefs, there are many different logical forms that these beliefs could have
(Del Pinal and Spaulding, 2017). More generally, these views do not directly
tackle whether, if we consider a taxonomy based on the way in which biases are
encoded, there are fundamentally different kinds of biases. Our studies consti-
tutes a significant step forward in that we provide empirical evidence for one
concrete way in which implicit biases can be encoded in conceptual structures—
namely, in dependency networks—which should be strictly distinguished from
biases encoded only in salient-statistical associations.
Second, the debate between ‘associative’ and ‘propositional’ interpretations
of implicit bias has so far centered on the nature of the psychological constructs
that explain timed measures of response latency or error, such as the IAT. We
have argued that important biases may not be detected by such measures. In
general, there is no reason to think that IATs can be used to detect dependency
networks. To the contrary, we think that the features that are (perceived to
be) salient or typical of certain groups will often differ from those that are (per-
ceived to be) central to those groups (see Sloman et al., 1998). On our view,
both salient-statistical associations, some of which are captured by IAT scores,
and dependency networks, which are captured by measures such as the Keil
reasoning task used in Study 2, play a role in social cognition and discrimina-
tion. Salient-statistical associations and central features thus need not be seen
as competing to explain the same set of phenomena, but may instead explain
different phenomena, or make different contributions in a particular case. In
general, we find the view that there is ‘one’ sort of bias, whether associative or
propositional, driving all discrimination to be implausible and empirically un-
supported. In this article, we have argued that there are at least two main ways
in which biases can be encoded in our concepts—namely, in salient-statistical as-
sociations or in dependency networks—each with unique implications for social
cognition.
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